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ABSTRACT
We investigate how an adversary can optimally use its query budget
for targeted evasion attacks against deep neural networks in a black-
box setting. We formalize the problem setting and systematically
evaluate what benefits the adversary can gain by using substitute
models. We show that there is an exploration-exploitation tradeoff
in that query efficiency comes at the cost of effectiveness. We present
two new attack strategies for using substitute models and show that
they are as effective as previous “query-only” techniques but require
significantly fewer queries, by up to three orders of magnitude. We
also show that an agile adversary capable of switching through
different attack techniques can achieve pareto-optimal efficiency.
We demonstrate our attack against Google Cloud Vision showing
that the difficulty of black-box attacks against real-world prediction
APIs is significantly easier than previously thought (requiring ≈500
queries instead of ≈20,000 as in previous works).
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1 INTRODUCTION
The immense surge in the popularity of machine learning appli-
cations in recent years has been accompanied by concerns about
their security and privacy. One such concern is evasion. Given a
machine learning classifier (victim) and a particular input (goal),
evasion is the process of finding an adversarial example [4, 39] that
is sufficiently close to the goal, but will fool the victim classifier
into outputting a different class label than that for the goal. When
the adversary aims for a specific misclassified label, evasion is said
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to be targeted. For image classifiers, the difference between the
adversarial example and goal images is imperceptible to humans.
Early techniques for finding adversarial examples against deep
neural networks (DNNs) for image classification assumed a white-
box setting, where the adversary knows the architecture andweights
of the victim DNN [14, 39]. Since DNN cost functions are differen-
tiable, these techniques calculated minimal changes (perturbations)
to images which resulted in the DNN misclassifying the modified
image. Later work addressed the black-box setting, where this per-
turbation cannot be directly calculated. Papernot et al [33] demon-
strated that adversarial examples exhibit transferability: adversarial
examples for one DNN (substitute model) are likely to be adversarial
to another DNN (victim model) when they are trained on datasets
with a similar distribution. Liu et al [28] empirically demonstrated
that using an ensemble of substitute models instead of a single one
results in better transferability. We call the state-of-the-art tech-
niques in this category, such as [28] which rely exclusively on the
use of ensembles as Ens. These are efficient in that the adversary
needs to access the victim DNN only once (to test the adversarial
example) but are not effective in targeted evasion because they may
not always result in successful adversarial examples.
An alternative approach for targeted black-box evasion is where
the adversary repeatedly queries the prediction API of a victim
DNN, and estimates its gradient solely based on the responses to
the queries. We call this class of techniques [5, 7, 21], query-only:
QO. These techniques are highly effective, reaching up to 100%.
But they are inefficient. For example, even state-of-the-art methods
[22] require up to 10 000 API queries for Google’s Inception v3 [38]
to reach a success rate of 95.6% assuming that the API returns
probability scores for all labels. Real-life DNN APIs often work in a
partial information (PI) setting [21], where the API only returns the
top-k scores which further degrades the efficiency of QO techniques:
the state-of-the-art to the best of our knowledge is [21] which
reports requiring 350,000 queries reach a success rate of 93.6% on
this network in a PI setting.
In this paper, we ask if we can design targeted black-box eva-
sion techniques that are simultaneously efficient and effective. We
argue that a realistic solution should (a) be designed for the partial-
information setting since real-life APIs often use this setting1; and
(b) use ensembles because of the widespread availability of public,
pre-trained models. Our contributions are as follows:
• We show that Ens followed by QO (EQ) can outperform pure
QO techniques (Sec. 4.6).
• We present PRISM and PRISMR , two new targeted black-box
evasion techniques that (a) starts from an input with the tar-
get label, and (b) repeatedly query the victim API (within a
1e.g. https://cloud.google.com/vision/, https://clarifai.com/demo
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
03
39
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  8
 Ju
n 2
01
9
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Juuti, et al.
Figure 1: Comparison of targeted black-box attacks against a
partial informationResNet-152model using different strate-
gies: QO [21] vs. EQ (using MIFGSM for gradient estima-
tion [8], followed by QO), vs. a fully agile adversary EPPRQ
switching through all methods (Sec.4.6).
query budget) while concurrently using an ensemble to esti-
mate victim’s gradient in a PI setting. (Sec. 3.2). We show that
the effectiveness of PRISM is comparable to QO on publicly
available ImageNet models while typically requiring fewer vic-
tim queries by three orders of magnitude (Sec. 4.5).
• We systematically compare the different evasion approaches
to show that an agile adversary can switch through these ap-
proaches in a particular order to achieve optimal efficiency,
e.g. 13219 queries on average to reach the effectiveness 94% on
Inception v3 in PI setting (Sec. 4.6).
• We demonstrate the real-world applicability of PRISM by pro-
ducing a targeted adversarial example against Google Cloud
Vision, reducing the number of queries required from an esti-
mate of 20,000 queries [21] to approximately 500 (Sec. 4.7).
Figure 1 shows the benefit of attacker agility by comparing differ-
ent strategies: QO vs. EQ vs. a fully agile adversary EPPRQ who
switches through all methods (Ens, PRISM, PRISMR and QO). In
Section 5, we discuss possible reasons why the PRISM approach is
effective.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We first lay out definitions of frequently used concepts and func-
tions in this work, with the focus on the image domain.
2.1 API definitions
Classifier, clf: a function that maps an arbitrary input image
x ∈ [0, 1]c×w×h to a vector of probabilities p ∈ [0, 1]N, denoting
clf’s confidence in assigning x to any of the pre-defined classes
{1, . . . ,N}. The elements of p sum to 1. Here c refers to the number
of color channels, w to the width and h to the height of input x. A
deep neural network dnn is a particular type of clf parameterized
withM sequential functions:
dnn(x) = fM ◦ fM−1 ◦ . . . f2 ◦ f1 ◦ x, (1)
where each function fi (z) can be expressed as σi (wTi z + bi ),
where σi is a (nonlinear) function,wi is a weight matrix and bi is a
bias vector. In this work, we focus on dnn-based image classifiers. In
a typical dnn, σi is selected as a differentiable function. Therefore,
it can calculate the gradient of classification error (∇xdnn) in order
to minimize this error easily in the training procedure [13].
Preprocessor, pre: A function that receives an input x ∈ IRc×h×w
and produces an output x′ ∈ IRc′×h′×w′ , and is primarily used for
formatting, normalizing and resizing input x before it is classified
by dnn, since dnn only processes fixed input sizes. pre can be used
to break the differentiability property of dnn and act as a form of
defense (shattered gradients, [3]).
Postprocessor, post: A function that receives input p ∈ IRN and
produces an output p′ ∈ IRN′ . It is used for formatting the output
p of dnn, both for readability and limiting information from dnn.
Common choices are:
• Identity function: postI (x) ← I(x) ∀x
• Label-only: postL(x) ← argmax(x), i.e. the index i ∈ {1, ...,N }
with the largest value in x .
• Top-k: postk(x) ← wk · x ∈ IRN, such that wk, i ← 1 iff i is
among the k first values in sorted(x), where x is sorted in
descending order. wk, i ← 0 for others.
API:. A combination of pre, dnn and post that responds to arbi-
trary client, CLI, queries x with the following response:
preAPIpost(x) = post ◦ dnn ◦ pre ◦ x (2)
An ideal API always responds to CLI ’s queries x, as long as x is not
malformatted. Prior work in black-box adversarial examples how-
ever typically do not use preprocessing on APIs pre(x) = I(x) = x.
In this paper, we only focus on preprocessing that resizes input
correctly for dnn.
White-box access: CLI knows the precise definition of every in-
termediate function applied on any arbitrary input x. Moreover,
pre(x) = post(x) = I(x), i.e. CLI has access to all of dnn’s outputs.
Gray-box access: CLI does not know the full definition of pre
and post or the network parameters of dnn, but may know other
information such as the architecture, hyper-parameters, training
method and the training set of dnn [29].
Black-box access: CLI does not know the exact forms of any
intermediate functions. Different authors define the minutiae of
black-box API differently, we adapt these as follows (in order of
decreasing privilege):
• Maximum information (APII ): dnn is secret, while CLI has
access to probabilities or logits from dnn for arbitrary input
x [22].
• Partial information (APIk ): CLI has access to top-k output
from dnn for arbitrary input x [21]. Generally, a realistic API
has a long probability list p ∈ IRN with N ≥ 1000 and returns
a small subset of this list (k ≪ N ).
• Label-only (APIL ): CLI has access only to labels from dnn
for arbitrary input x [21].
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2.2 Adversarial example definitions
Adversarial example: The adversary aims to produce an adver-
sarial example xadv that is very similar to a goal image xgoal, but
evades classification by API: API(xadv) , API(xgoal) (non-targeted
evasion). The similarity between xgoal and xadv is often evaluated
by an Lp -norm [36]:
xgoal − xadvp. In this work, we set p = ∞ as
is common. In targeted evasion, adversarial examples require that
y′ ← API(xadv) for a pre-defined class y′ , API(xgoal). Targeted
evasion is described in Equation 3.
y′ ← API(xadv)
s.t.
xgoal − xadv∞ ≤ ϵ
xgoal,xadv ∈ [0, 1]c×w×h,
(3)
where ϵ is the allowed perturbation size.
White-box attacker, AWbox, is a malicious client that has white-
box access to API which it tries to evade. Since AWbox knows the
precise definition of every intermediate function in dnn inside API,
it is able to calculate the gradient of the classification error with
respect to the input image:∇xdnn. It uses this information tomodify
xadv. Existing evasion methods such as single-step fast gradient
sign method FGSM [15] and iterative version of it I-FGSM [26]
find adversarial example xadv by maximizing the cross entropy loss
function of dnn under L∞-norm.
Black-box attacker, ABbox, is a malicious client that has black-
box access to API′ that it tries to evade. Rotations and transla-
tion operations are often enough to create non-targeted evasion
in black-box APIs [10]. However, in order to create targeted adver-
sarial examples with a small perturbation, an approximation to the
gradient information, Gˆ′dnn, of the target classifier dnn′ becomes
necessary. There are two predominant ways of obtaining this infor-
mation: (a) gradient approximation through transferability and (b)
finite-difference methods.
Transferability: An adversarial example developed for evading
one API (dnn) can be also adversarial to another API′ (dnn′), i.e.
y′ ← API′(xadv)
s.t. Equation (3)
(4)
Recently, Adam et al. [1] found that the cosine similarity be-
tween the gradient ∇xdnn’ and the available gradient ∇xdnn is a
reliable estimator for transferability. Thus, implicitly the following
approximation occurs during transferability:
∇xdnn ≈ ∇xdnn′ (5)
Liu et al. [28] states that transferability depends on the architectural
similarity of dnn′ and dnn.
Baseline transferability attack: Adversary ABbox has a label-
only black-box access to API′. It tries to evade API′ by creating
adversarial examples using many available APIs and relies on the
transferability property holds for the attacker’s adversarial exam-
ples. Current state-of-the-art transferability attacks use ensembles
of pre-trained DNNs as dnn [28]. A momentum-iterative version
of FGSM (MIFGSM) [8], won both the targeted and non-targeted
evasion competition at the NIPS workshop in 2017 and is since then
Figure 2: Decision boundaries of anMLP classifier (3 classes).
Targeted evasionwith Ens, starting from goal at origin. Max-
imummodification ϵ indicated with a red square. Toy exam-
ple: perturbations bounded with an L2-norm.
considered to be the strongest L∞-bounded transferability attack.
We call this evasion method Ens. We provide an illustration for Ens
evasion for a toy example in Figure 2. The classifier in the figure is
a multilayer perceptron (MLP) [31] with three classes.
The effectiveness of transferability attacks is usually reported in
terms of whether the victim model is fooled when it is queried with
the adversarial example once. In Section 4.4, we explore whether
allowing multiple queries brings any benefit to the adversary. Ens
starts querying API′ once it has reached the maximum allowed
modification ϵ , as an effort to reduce the number of queries.
Finite-difference methods, FDM, which are also known as zero-
order optimization methods, directly estimate gradients Gˆdnn′(x)
for a target API′ by making repeated queries around x [7, 21, 22,
41] and recording minute differences in the returned values. The
baseline assumption is that API′ returns maximum information
(API′I ). However, this is not a realistic assumption in practice. For
example, Google Vision and Clarifai both return only top-k results
from dnn.
Some papers [5, 21] report results under these more realistic
APIs. The efficiency of FDMs under these API models degrades, e.g.
[21] evaluates that the median number of queries grows to approx-
imately 50,000 per example with API′k=1, whereas they were found
to be approximately 10,000 per example with API′I . The number of
queries further grows to 2.7 million with API′L
Evasion against API′k=1 requires a change in the creation of tar-
geted adversarial examples. Since API′k=1 does not return feedback
on any other class than the top-1 label, xadv must always remain
as the top-1 label. Evasion needs to initialize the adversarial image
with another image xstart of the target class y′:
x0adv ← xstart
s.t. API′k=1(x0adv) = y′,
(6)
We define j-th iteration of an adversarial image x jadv as a series of j
modifications of x0adv towards the original image xgoal. The distance
between j-th adversarial image x jadv and xgoal gradually decreases
when j increases, so that the evasion process eventually ends with
x iadv (i ≥ j) that is within a ϵ-distance from a goal image xgoal:
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y′ ← API′k=1(x iadv)
s.t.
x iadv − xgoal∞ ≤ ϵ
1 ≤ i ≤ B,
(7)
where B is maximum number of queries allowed by the API′k=1.
[21] reported success at attacking Google Cloud Vision (GCV, De-
cember 2017) using this strategy, successfully fooling the system
with perturbation size ϵ = 25.5/255. However, success came at a
high cost: approximately some 170 gradient estimation steps, which
we estimate is approximately 20,000 queries for one sample2 they
provide. We call this evasion method QO. QO relies on the black-
box optimization technique Natural Evolution Strategies (NES) by
Wiestra et al. [43], which is used for gradient estimation. This is a
common limitation in all QO methods, since they rely on querying
API′ at all steps. The authors report a success rate of 93.6% on
creating targeted adversarial examples for Inception v3 [38], using
a budget of 1 million queries.
Figure 3: Decision boundaries of anMLP classifier (3 classes).
Targeted evasion with QO, starting from start and gradu-
ally approaching goal at origin. Maximum modification ϵ
indicated with a red square. Toy example: perturbations
bounded with an L2-norm.
3 PRISM
We further extend upon the previously mentioned methods, but
evaluate a more realistic adversary. Our motivation is as follows.
Due to the recent trend of striving for reproducibility in machine
learning, tens or hundreds of pretrained models are available to
the adversary. At the same time, model owners limit the APIs to
only reveal partial information (Sec. 2.1). We focus on an adversary
models where: For that we propose the PRISM method: a novel
way of attacking such APIs. We then define our evaluation criteria:
success and pareto-efficiency. We begin with defining the adversary
next.
3.1 Adversary model
Goal and capabilities: The goal of the adversary ABbox is to
evade a black-box API′ hosting dnn′ which classifies ImageNet
2URL: https://www.labsix.org/media/2017/12/20/skier_adv.png. GCV has been re-
trained since then and the sample they provide does not evade GCV in March, 2019.
images. ABbox can query the API′ multiple times and continue
attacking until a successful evasion attack is encountered or a rea-
sonable query budget B is exceeded. ABbox has access to several
other publicly available pre-trained ImageNet DNNs [18–20, 37, 38]
that it is free to combine in any way to reach its goal.ABbox is agile,
meaning that given a set of evasion methods, ABbox will choose
the method that is most likely to result in evasion with a minimum
number of query. Given a setting s = (xstart,xgoal,y′, API′),ABbox
chooses an evasion methodmi while considering the query budget
B, and produces targeted adversarial example xadv.
Attack surface: ABbox attacks a partial information API′k=1: it
has the format as defined in Equation 2 and returns the top-1 output
from dnn′. ABbox does not know the native image size of dnn′ nor
the resizing operator in pre. API′ is an ideal API: it always returns
responses to queries.
3.2 PRISM attack technique
Next, we describe PRISM (partial information substitutemodel), an
approach for targeted evasion technique that combines strengths
we identified in Ens and QO. We start by providing an illustration
of PRISM in Figure 4. Conceptually, PRISM is similar to QO in
Figure 3: it starts the evasion process with image xstart of the target
class y′ (Equation 6) and finishes when it finds a solution that is
within an ϵ-distance to goal image xдoal (Equation 7). Initially,
xstart is at distance
xstart − xgoal∞ = d ≫ ϵ The method consists
of several iterations of increasing the classification likelihood of the
j-th iteration x jadv by stepping in the direction of the approximated
gradient Gˆdnn′ and then projecting it closer to xgoal. The procedure
continues until the distance between x jadv and x decreases to ϵ , and
xadv is classified as the target class y′ by API′k=1 or until a query
budget B has been exceeded. Although the process of finding xadv
is similar to QO [21], the gradient estimator comes via substitute
model ensembles and MIFGSM as is done in Ens [8]. We detail
pseudocode for PRISM in Algorithm 1.
Figure 4: Decision boundaries of anMLP classifier (3 classes).
Targeted evasion with PRISM, starting from start and grad-
ually approaching goal at origin. Maximum modification
ϵ indicated with a red square. Toy example: perturbations
bounded with an L2-norm.
The following steps highlight the differences between PRISM
and QO algorithms:
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S1. We set Gˆdnn′(x) ← Ens(x) in PRISM, which comes from the
ensemble models and therefore does not consume queries.
With default settings, QO uses 100 queries to determine
Gˆdnn′(x) via finite-difference methods.
S2. QO uses line search [31] to find an appropriate step size with
the purpose of reducing queries. PRISM does not do this,
since no queries are used.
S3. Since PRISM relies on gradient estimates from substitute
models, we can aggressively avoid using queries until d has
reached ϵ . QO cannot do this, as it needs to remain inside
the top-k region in order to calculate gradients.
Algorithm 1 PRISM attack technique
Require: Target APIk(x ′), goal image xgoal, targeted classy′, start-
ing image of target class xstart, gradient estimator Gˆ(x ′), goal
L∞-distance ϵ ← 0.05, patience C ← 5, update threshold
tadv ← 20%, initial L∞-distance limit d ← 0.50, δϵ ← 0.005.
x ′ ← Clip(x ′,xstart − d,xstart + d)
while d > ϵ and APIL(xadv) , y′ do
S1. д′ ← Gˆ(x ′) {gradient estimation}
S2. x ′ ← xadv + η · siдn(д′).
x ′ ← Clip(x ′,xgoal − d,xgoal + d).
if d = ϵ then
topk← APIk(x ′).
else
S3. topk← [y′]. {Pseudolabel until d ← ϵ}
end if
if y′ ∈ topk then
xadv ← x ′
if topk[y′] ≥ tadv then
xbacktrack ← xadv {update high-confidence x ′}
end if
d ←max(ϵ, ϵ − δϵ )
else
c ← c + 1
if c > C then
xadv ← xbacktrack
end if
end if
end while
It is important to note that PRISM succeeds only as long as Re-
lation 5 holds. For this, we calculate Gˆdnn′ using a large ensemble
(approximately 10 models). We further define PRISMR as a vari-
ant of PRISM, with an emphasis on diversity. Instead of always
using the same ensemble for gradient estimation like in PRISM,
PRISMR subsamples a random number of ensembles and calculates
the gradient with these ensembles using Ens method.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Experimental setup
We first describe our experimental setup, target models and black-
box evasion methods. We take the 100 examples from ImageNet as
Table 1: Shorthand notation for DNNs.
Classifier name (acronym) Input size
1 SqeezeNet 1.0 (SN1.0) [20] 224
2 SqeezeNet 1.1 (SN1.1) [20] 224
3 ResNet-18 (RN18) [18] 224
4 ResNet-34 (RN34) [18] 224
5 ResNet-50 (RN50) [18] 224
6 DenseNet-121 (DN121) [19] 224
7 DenseNet-169 (DN169) [19] 224
8 DenseNet-201 (DN201) [19] 224
9 VGG11 [37] 224
10 VGG16 [37] 224
11 ResNet-101 (RN101) [18] 224
12 ResNet-152 (RN152) [18] 224
13 Inception v3 (IncV3) [38] 299
our initial images. These images were used in prior research [28]3,
where they were chosen randomly from the ImageNet validation
set, such that they were classified correctly by all models in their
experiments. We use these images as xgoal. Our adversary model
also specifies xstart. Since the dataset [28] does not consider the
partial information setting, we choose xgoal, xstart and target class
y′ from this dataset according to Algorithm 2. We use this setup
for all 100 experiments.
Algorithm 2 Experiment Setup
Require: dataset D with 100 entries ei, each entry in format ei =
(xi, ci), where xi refers to an image, and ci is the assigned class
for i ← 0 to 100 do
xgoal ← xi
xstart ← xi+1 mod 100
y′ ← ci+1 mod 100
end for
Weuse the classifiers defined in Table 1 in our evaluation. All clas-
sifiers process input of the size [0, 1]3×224×224, apart from Inception
v3, which processes input of size [0, 1]3×299×299. Further, all classi-
fiers expect input to be normalized with RGB color-channel means
(0.485, 0.456, 0.406) and standard deviations (0.229, 0.224, 0.225),
whereas Inception v3 expects input to be normalized to range [0, 1]
in all color channels. We re-normalize data to the correct range
before processing it each classifier, and ensure that images are of
correct size with bilinear interpolation.
We define our target APIs and substitute model ensembles in
Table 2. For target APIs, we chose Inception v3, ResNet-101, ResNet-
152 and VGG16 to experiment with different architecture choices
having a low error rate in ImageNet examples4. The choice for
ensemble components is also shown in Table 2. We choose to divide
the target models and ensemble models in this way to study the
effect of PRISM between similar architectures (ResNet models, VGG
models) and different architectures (Inception as target model). We
3https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/transferability-advdnn-pub/blob/master/data/
image_label_target.csv
4https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models.html
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Table 2: Ensemble models and target API used in this work.
Shorthand notation from Table 1.
Target Ensemble components
IncV3 Models 1–10
RN101 Models 1–10
VGG16 Models 1–9, 11
RN152 Models 1–11
Table 3: Evasionmethods. Methods 1–3 use substitutemodel
ensembles from Table 2, while Method 4’s formulation does
notmake use of substitutemodels. Method 1 starts adversar-
ial example creation from the goal image xgoal, while Meth-
ods 2–4 have separate goal images and start images.
Method Grad. est. Gˆdnn′ Start class of xstart
1 Ens MIFGSM [8], full ens. API′L (xgoal)
2 PRISM MIFGSM [8], full ens. y′
3 PRISMR MIFGSM [8], subset ens. y′
4 QO NES [43] y′
also formulate target models as API′k=1, i.e the attacker can only ob-
tain top-1 output from the target model. The ensemble components
were chosen with the principle of adding components of different
architecture families (SqueezeNet, ResNet, VGG, DenseNet) until
the graphics card memory (GeForce 1060, 6GB) was filled. While we
could have an even created a stronger adversary by loading addi-
tional models in RAM, we found that this represented a reasonably
strong and efficient adversary.
We investigate the methods shown in Table 3 in this work. Meth-
ods 1 (Ens) [8] and 4 (QO) [21] are state-of-the-art methods among
black-box transferable evasion methods, and FDM attacks on partial
information APIs, respectively. We investigate how well Ens can
reach eventual success, by continuing to query API until a specified
query budget is exceeded or success is encountered. Additionally,
two variants are investigated. PRISM is a straightforward adapta-
tion of Ens for the setting where xstart , xgoal. PRISMR is a variant
of PRISM, using random subsets of the ensemble. We set the query
limit to 100,000 queries for QO, and 1,000 for methods Ens, PRISM
and PRISMR after a preliminary investigation. To ensure consis-
tency, all methods are evaluated with PyTorch. We imported the
code for QO from the authors’ TensorFlow repository5 with default
parameters. Methods Ens, PRISM and PRISMR use MIFGSM with
the suggested momentum parameter µ = 1 and are evaluated with
the same ensembles. We evaluate adversarial examples with maxi-
mum perturbation
xadv − xgoal∞ ≤ ϵ = 0.05, and step size 0.005
(in Ens, PRISM and PRISMR ), meaning that at least 10 MIFGSM
steps are taking before querying the API for the first time. Meth-
ods Ens, PRISM and PRISMR start querying target APIs only after
reaching this perturbation. To make results comparable, we assume
no knowledge of the resizing operator on each target API. Instead,
black-box attacker ABbox produces input of the size [0, 1]3×224×224
in all methods.
5https://github.com/labsix/limited-blackbox-attacks
Table 4: Effectiveness of baseline black-box evasion meth-
ods Ens and QO, and an agile adversary EQ. Success rate and
average number of queries required for success.
One query Up to 100,000 queries
Ens QO EQ
IncV3 12% : 1 88% : 44158 89%: 40029
RN101 47%: 1 89%: 32864 96%: 18874
VGG16 47%: 1 94%: 28875 94%: 17433
RN152 58%: 1 91%: 34689 95%: 14754
4.2 Evaluation criteria
We next define criteria that we use to compare evasion methods.
Success: A boolean value denoting whether a targeted adversar-
ial example xadv created by methodmi , for API′ such that y′ ←
API′(xadv), using at most B queries. Success rate refers to how often
success occurred in an experiment.
Pareto-efficiency: given certain evasion setting s, a set of meth-
ods {m1, . . . ,mL} and a criteriametricq(xstart,xgoal,y′, API′,mi ) =
q(s,mi ), a methodmi is said to be pareto-efficient for setting s if
q(s,mi ) ≤ q(s,mj ) ∀i, j ∈ 1, . . . ,L, i , j, (8)
i.e.mi produces the smallest criteria metricq for setting s. Pareto-
efficiency is a descriptive property: given an experiment, we may
calculate this statistic in hindsight.
Dominance: a methodmi∗ is said to dominate other methods in
a range q ∈ [a,b] if
E(q(s,mi∗)) <E(q(s,mj )) ∀i∗, j ∈ 1, . . . ,L, i∗ , j
q∗ = min
i
q(s,mi ) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,L}
q∗ ∈ [a,b],
(9)
where E(·) is the expectation operator, i.e. we expect thatmi∗
will produce the smallest performance metric, given that the pareto-
efficient choice produces a metric in the range [a,b]. We consider
the performance criteria q* in this paper. q* is theminimumnumber
of queries to API’ it requires to produce an adversarial example
that is classified as class y′ on API’ given setup s . Dominance is a
predictive property: given previous tests, we may extrapolate future
performance.
4.3 Baseline evaluations and basic agility
We first evaluate the baseline methods Ens and QO and how an
agile adversary can simply increase efficiency and effectiveness. We
show these results in Table 4. The success rate of Ens on the first try
is shown in the leftmost column (up to 58% on RN152). The success
rate on IncV3 is only 12%. We attribute this to the resize operator
in IncV3, which resizes input from (3× 224× 224) to (3× 299× 299)
(cf. Table 1). For example, Xie et al. [44] too found that resizing and
cropping operations can act as a form of defense against adversarial
examples.
On the other extreme, QO reaches approximately 90% success
rate on all target APIs with up to 100,000 queries.QO takes between
28,000 and 44,000 queries in average to succeed.
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Table 5: Effectiveness of black-box evasionmethods, success
rate andmedian number of queries required for success.
Up to 1000 queries
Ens PRISM PRISMR QO
IncV3 26%: 2 69%: 11 75%: 14 0%: -
RN101 83%: 1 88%: 8 93%: 12 0%: -
VGG16 82%: 1 89%: 10 90%: 13 0%: -
RN152 84%: 1 95%: 8 96%: 11 0%: -
We argue that the pareto-efficient choice for ABbox is to switch
from one method to another when it becomes apparent that the
first method will not succeed. Such an agile adversary can combine
the previous methods: after the first query, is done through Ens, the
remaining 99,999 queries can be done with QO. We call this simple
agile method EQ. We see in Table 4 that the success rate for EQ is
between 0–7 percentage points higher than with QO only. In these
cases, Ens efficiently (1 query) finds an adversarial example that
QO fails at. This occurs especially on RN101 and RN152. We suspect
this occurs due to similarity of some of the ensemble components
(Table 2). EQ can decrease the average queries between 42 – 58
% on RN101, VGG16 and RN152, i.e. models where Ens produces
satisfactory transferability.
4.4 PRISM effectiveness
Next we evaluate variants of PRISM and compare them to the base-
line methods. We show success statistics for each of these four
methods in Table 5, given our experimental setup and a query bud-
get of 1000 queries. Columns are arranged in the order of methods
presented in Table 3. Columns 1 – 3 represent query use with sub-
stitute models, which we advocate in this paper. If we continue
querying for up to 1000 times Ens reaches a high success rate on
RN101, VGG16 and RN152 (between 82% – 84%). However, Ens
success with 1000 queries on IncV3 is significantly lower: only 26%.
PRISM and PRISMR reach 69% and 75% success rates respectively
on IncV3, while limited to the same query budget as Ens. By com-
parison, QO does not reach success since the query budget is too
low.
By comparing Tables 4 and 5, we see that the success rate of
PRISMR is in fact very similar as QO on RN101, VGG16 and RN152,
while for most of the cases requiring 3 orders of magnitude fewer
queries. We also see that in most cases, methods that enable higher
success rate do this at the expense of a higher number of median
queries. This motivates us to study the comparative effectiveness
of different methods. Knowledge of such patterns can help in de-
veloping more efficient agile attacks than the one presented in
Section 4.3.
4.5 Pareto-efficiency of methods
We show the query efficiency of the four methods in Figures 5(a)
to 5(c) on IncV3, RN101 and VGG16. The results are sorted so that
the examples that required the least number of queries are ordered
to the left side. We see that some of the examples are significantly
harder than others (positive trend across colors). The most effec-
tive methods are connected by a grey dotted line, denoting the
pareto-efficient choices. We also see a progression that the most
efficient methods on the left side do not work efficiently on the
right side. It is harder to find adversarial examples in some exper-
iments than others: by this we mean that the minimum number
of queries required to create adversarial examples are bigger than
in others. This hints at an inherent exploration-exploitation trade-
off: methods that are the most efficient find the universally easy
solutions quickly (good exploitation), but tend to underperform on
more difficult tasks (poor exploration).
4.6 Dominance and efficient strategies
Factoring out the trivial case of transferability, we may ask what
is the optimal evasion method, given a certain “hardness” of the
task. Using the data points in the previous figure, we can predict
which method performs best given a certain region of required
queries. Dominance (Equation 9) can be the treated as a multiclass
classification problem: finding the most efficient evasion method,
given a certain region of required queries. We solve the problem
with multinomial logistic regression. Dominance regions are shown
in Figures 5(d) to 5(f), and give hints about when it is sensible to
switch evasion algorithms, calculated separately for each target
model.
Table 6: Approximate dominance regions of evasion meth-
ods in Figures 5(a) to 5(c) on IncV3, RN101 and VGG16.
Ens PRISM PRISMR QO
0–1 1–50 50–1,000 1,000–100,000
We identify approximate dominance regions in Table 6. The
results indicate a optimal progression of methods to try out, in the
order of 1 to 4. Using this we can calculate several instantiations of
efficient attacker strategies, e.g. EPPRQ tries Ens for the first query,
PRISM during queries 2–50, PRISMR between 51–1000 and the rest
with QO. Following this strategy, we calculate that the average
number of queries required to create adversarial examples on each
target model in Table 7. We compare this strategy to only using
EPPR and the previously presented EQ and QO.
EPPRQ is the most effective strategy. It reaches between 94% –
100% success rate on the evaluated models, which is betwen 3 and
11 points higher than QO alone, while using between 2.27× and
24.43× less queries. EPPRQ is also more efficient than EQ, while
Table 7: Comparison on effectiveness and efficiency of
EPPRQ compared to EPQ, EQ and QO. Column 1 details
the success rate and average number of queries for success.
Columns 2 – 4 compare this to alternative attacker strategies.
Row-wise best results are bolded.
EPPRQ Cmp. EPQ Cmp. EQ Cmp. QO
IncV3 94%:13477 ±0 pp: 1.12× -5 pp: 1.97× -6 pp: 2.27×
RN101 100%:2882 -1 pp: 1.56× -5 pp: 6.55× -11 pp:11.40×
VGG16 97%: 3497 ±0 pp: 1.00× -3 pp: 4.98× -3 pp: 8.26×
RN152 100%:1419 -1 pp: 1.36× -5 pp:10.39× -9 pp:24.43×
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(a) Inception v3 (b) ResNet-101 (c) VGG16
(d) Inception v3 (e) ResNet-101 (f) VGG16
Figure 5: Subfigures 5(a) – 5(c) illustrate pareto-efficiency of Ens (light blue dot), and QO (light green square), PRISM (dark
blue down-pointing triangle) and PRISMR (dark green up-pointing triangle), evaluated against number of queries required to
generate an adversarial example against three models: IncV3, RN101 and VGG16. Subfigures 5(d) – 5(f) illustrate dominance
regions. Dominance is calculated as per Equation 9 and illustrates the most effective methods given a certain query region.
The thick lines illustrate when methods are optimal and the confidence of that optimality.
being significantly more effective. It is clear that PRISM is helpful
towards increasing success rate and reducing queries.
We also compare EPPRQ to EPQ, to confirmwhether PRISMR has
any impact on EPPRQ. We see that the inclusion of PRISMR does
not impact the success rate, but does impact the average number of
queries on RN101 and RN152.
We additionally compare an attack strategy that only relies on
gradient estimates from substitute model ensembles: EPPR . We
compare this strategy to EQ and QO in Table 8. In one case out of
four, EPPR is most effective, and beats all strategies in efficiency: it
uses 2.6–2.8 orders of magnitude fewer queries than the basic agile
attack EQ, and 2.6–3.1 orders of magnitude fewer queries than QO.
With these results we wish to highlight that agile attackers can
present a realistic threat to prediction APIs. We next discuss the
threat that PRISM poses to real-life prediction APIs.
Table 8: Comparison on effectiveness and efficiency of EPPR
compared to EQ and QO. Comparative success rate success
rate and average number of queries for success. Row-wise
best results are bolded.
EPPR Cmp. EQ QO
IncV3 74%: 107 +14 pp: 387× +13 pp: 427×
RN101 94%: 30 +1 pp: 667× -5pp: 1162×
VGG16 91%: 37 +3 pp: 496× +3 pp: 798×
RN152 98%: 28 -3 pp : 530× -7 pp: 1246×
4.7 Applicability to real-life APIs
As a proof-of-concept, we tested PRISM against Google Cloud Vi-
sion (GCV) API6. GCV does not exactly fit our adversary model
6Real-time attack demo: https://www.dropbox.com/s/dzebo14v864sah2/Screencast%
202019-05-14%2019%3A05%3A37.mp4?dl=0
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(Sect. 3.1), as it is trained with non-public data and uses different
labels than the substitute models have. This means that the approx-
imation in Relation 5 does not hold well. As we saw in Section 4.5,
some setups are harder than others. To provide a comparison with
previous techniques, we took the same goal image as in Ilyas et
al. [21], with the task of changing the image classification of an
image with two skiers to “Canidae” (dog-like mammal), and set
ϵ = 0.10 (as in [21]). However, GCV is under development and
becomes more robust to adversarial examples. For example, the
original attack example in Ilyas et al. [21] does not fool GCV any-
more. For the the attack on GCV, we thus relaxed the optimization
step S3 (Algorithm 1), and queried all intermediate crafted samples
(thus requiring at a minimum 40 queries to go from d = 0.50 to
d = ϵ = 0.10 with step size 0.01).
Nevertheless, we still succeeded. Figure 6 shows the adversarial
image that fools GCV in May 2019. The attack required in average
500 queries. However, we found a large difference in the efficiency
of our attack between January 2019 and May 2019. In January 2019,
we found that approximately 400 queries were enough to fool GCV
with modifications of size ϵ = 5%.
Even with 500 queries, the monetary cost of producing adversar-
ial examples can be quite cheap, e.g. with current pricing approxi-
mately $0.60 per example. This is small compared to the previous
approach by [21], which required approximately $26 with current
pricing. We estimate that the cost of producing adversarial exam-
ples against real-world APIs can be further dropped by judiciously
optimizing the use of substitute model ensembles and agile attacks.
Figure 6: Adversarial example by PRISMR against GCV (May
14th, 2019, ϵ = 10%). Found using 390 queries.
5 DISCUSSION
Next, we study the effect of the size of the ensemble and attack
effectiveness. In order to understand the relationship between the
number of ensemble components and the effectiveness of substitute
model attacks like PRISM and Ens, we calculated the success rate
and the median number of queries required for success for different
ensemble sizes in Table 9. We increased the number of ensemble
components step-by-step from one to ten. We added models from
Table 1 to the ensemble in the order of their ImageNet validation
set accuracies7. As usual, we evaluate adversarial examples with
ϵ = 5%.
We make the following observations from Table 9. For a fixed ϵ ,
we see that adding more components to the ensemble both increases
the success rate while decreasing the median number of queries, for
all attacks. Adding components is helpful, even when the compo-
nent itself might have fairly low accuracy (SN1.1 & SN1.0). Table 9
also shows that the effectiveness of the attack increases rapidly
when a component with a similar architecture is added to the en-
semble (bold font). For example, when attacking VGG16, adding
VGG11 to the ensemble increases the success rate from 54% to 85%.
We see that PRISM performs better than Ens when several ensem-
ble components are used. We provide intuition as to why PRISM
performs better compared to Ens in Appendix A.
6 RELATEDWORK
Our paper explored a limited knowledge substitute learner adver-
sary model [30]. Other adversary models have also been considered:
Limited knowledge surrogate data: Tramer et al [40], Papernot
et al [34], Li et al. [35] and Juuti et al [24] develop model extrac-
tion attacks against DNNs by training a substitute model using
synthetic data. Labels are obtained by querying the target model.
The substitute model is later used to form transferable adversarial
examples.
Model confidentiality: There have been several attempts [12, 25,
27] to make the DNNs APIs oblivious, such that the API can process
inputs correctly without learning anything about the client’s input,
the client simultaneously does not learning anything about the
model behind the API.
Other black-box attacks using substitute models: Wang et al [42]
explore transfer learning, where a student model for a specific
application initialized by a publicly available pretrained teacher
model (e.g., Inception v3, VGG16 etc). They show that one can
compute adversarial perturbations that can mimic hidden layer
representations copied from the teacher in order to fool the student
model. They also used ensembles in the case of student model
knowledge and an unknown teacher model. They show that their
attack performance degrades if several layers of the student models
are fine-tuned. Ji et al [23] maliciously train pre-trained models
in order to implement model-reuse attacks against ML systems
without knowing the developer’s dataset or fine-tuning strategies.
Hashemi et al [17] query the target model with images that come
from a similar distribution as the training images of the targetmodel,
augment the dataset with random noise and use this augmented
dataset to train a substitute model. They craft adversarial examples
against the substitute model using Carlini & Wagner [6] method
and perform transferability attacks. However, for training substitute
models, they require logits from the target model in order to mimic
decision boundaries and this attack can fail in case of more limited
information. Guo et al [16] implemented non-differentiable image
transformation techniques as a preprocessor in order to defend
against black-box and gray-box model evasion attacks. This type of
7https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models.html
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Table 9: Ablation study on the size of ensembles for PRISM and Ens. The ensemble size is gradually increased from only one
(left) to ten (right). Components with highest top-1 accuracy evaluated first. Success rate and median number of queries for
success shown.
Number of components. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Target model IncV3
added model to ens. DN201 RN101 RN50 DN169 DN121 RN34 RN18 VGG11 SN1.1 SN1.0
Ens (1 query) 2% : 1 4%: 1 5%: 1 6%: 1 6%: 1 8%: 1 10%: 1 12%: 1 12%: 1 12%: 1
Ens (up to 1000 queries) 4% : 9 6%: 1 7%: 1 10%: 1 13%: 2 14%: 1 18%: 1 24%: 1 23%: 1 26%: 2
PRISM (up to 1000 queries) 2%: 89 6%: 60 12%: 28 16%: 27 26%: 14 41%: 15 54%: 12 60% 10 62%: 9 69%: 11
Target model RN101
added model to ens. DN201 RN50 DN169 DN121 RN34 VGG16 RN18 VGG11 SN1.1 SN1.0
Ens (1 query) 4%: 1 11%: 1 14%: 1 21%: 1 34%: 1 34%: 1 39%: 1 45%: 1 44%: 1 47%: 1
Ens (up to 1000 queries) 7%: 1 29%: 8 35%: 3 43%: 2 59%: 1 62%: 1 74%: 1 76%: 1 78%: 1 83%: 1
PRISM (up to 1000 queries) 7%: 84 34%: 29 49%: 26 56%: 16 69%: 14 69%: 12 83%: 8 85%: 8 87%: 9 88%: 8
Target model VGG16
added model to ens. DN201 RN101 RN50 DN169 DN121 RN34 RN18 VGG11 SN1.1 SN1.0
Ens (1 query) 1%: 1 3%: 1 3%: 1 6%: 1 13%: 1 13%: 1 21%: 1 41%: 1 42%: 1 47%: 1
Ens (up to 1000 queries) 6%: 11 9%: 87 13%: 17 20%: 10 26%: 1 34%: 5 44%: 2 75%: 1 80%: 1 82%: 1
PRISM (up to 1000 queries) 3%: 248 7%: 77 15%: 52 27%: 34 32%: 22 38%: 21 54%: 17 85%: 12 86%: 11 86%: 10
gradient obfuscation techniques are effective when the adversary
do not have the knowledge about the preprocessing method.
Finite-difference method attacks: Similarly to us, Du et al [9] also
consider the partial information attack, and separate between start
and goal images. However, they initialize the starting image with a
gray color and adopt NES for gradient estimation. They attacked
a cloud API (Clarifai food detection) by choosing a valid label
from top-k classes and minimizing the probability of so-called
non-object or background predictions. Although their gray-image
attack requires fewer queries than typical finite-difference meth-
ods as in [7, 21], the adversarial examples are unrecognizable by
humans, which is different from our case. Brendel et al [5] intro-
duce a decision-based attack which initializes the starting sample
that is already adversarial and walks along the boundary between
the adversarial and non-adversarial region as well as decreasing
the distance towards the target image. They only used top label
for initializing the starting image and finding the direction along
the boundary, which is similar to our evaluations, but their at-
tack requires more than an order of magnitude more iterations
than the attacks evaluated in this work. Other publications have
used gradient-free optimization techniques, such as genetic algo-
rithms [2] or greedy local search [32] over the image space in order
to craft adversarial image in a black-box setting.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented targeted evasion attacks using substitute model en-
sembles for black-box APIs. We showed that such attacks can
achieve very high effectiveness and efficiency: reaching similar
effectiveness as state-of-the-art finite-difference attacks on partial-
information APIs, while requiring up to 3 orders of magnitude fewer
queries. We showed that the attack relies on the appropriateness
of an implicit gradient estimation, and that this gradient approx-
imation benefits from larger substitute model ensembles. Query
use with ensembles seems like an interesting direction to explore
for future research. As a proof-of-concept, the partial-information
formulation of the attack was used to attack Google Cloud Vision,
where it succeeded in approximately 400 queries. We argue that
query-limited substitute model attacks form a pervasive threat
against present-day cloud APIs due to the availability of substitute
models and relatively cheap pricing.
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A APPENDIX
Figure 7 shows an evasion example created by PRISM in January,
2019.
Figure 7: Adversarial example by PRISM against GCV (Janu-
ary 7th, 2019, ϵ = 5%). Found using 425 queries.
We show an example of how PRISM evades black-box APIs
next. Figure 8 shows a resulting adversarial example, given a goal
image and a start image. Figure 9 shows the process of finding the
adversarial example with PRISM. The path that PRISM induces is
shown in Figure 9(a). Although it is a black-box attack, it essentially
follows a hill-climbing route due to the similarity of the gradients
of the substitute model and target model. The results in Figure 9(a)
suggest that a path between xstart and xadv may be found without
breaking the classification region of DNNs. The success behind
PRISM implies that DNNs have connected but complex classification
regions. These results reinforce empirical results by Fawzi et al [11]
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(a) xgoal (b) xadv found by PRISM (c) xstart
Figure 8: An example of an adversarial example xadv found by PRISM, given goal image xgoal and start image xstart. Created
against against IncV3 with perturbation ϵ = 5%.
(a) (Closed) linear span of (xstart, xadv) found by PRISM. Confined to range ((-0.1, 0.5), (0. 0.1)). PRISM finds an xadv where a linear interpolation
maintains the same classification region as xstart .
Figure 9: Example of linear spans of (xstart,xadv), starting with the same input, comparing two methods. The sample creation
starts in the lower right corner (0.5,0) and progresses towards (0,0). The process ends when the coordinate (0, 0.05) is reached
and the sample is still in the same classification region as in xstart. Evaluated with RN101. Green marks the original class (sea
gull), purple the target class (water buffalo) and orange other classes. Contour regions inside the purple region mark logit
values of RN101. Red dashed lines mark the path from xstart to xadv, projected down to the closest point in the linear span
of (xstart,xadv), in terms of L1-distance. Diagonal lines marks successive 5% absolute increments in L∞-distance: from xstart.
Classification regions sampled with resolution 121x21.
(a) Ens (b) QO (c) PRISM
Figure 10: Perturbations of adversarial examples. Created against against IncV3 with perturbation ϵ = 5%.
who claim that classification regions of DNNs form connected
regions, rather than isolated pockets.
We compare perturbations created by Ens, QO and PRISM in
Figure 10, evaluated with IncV3. The goal image and start image
are the same as in Figure 8(a) and 8(c). QO perturbations resemble
random noise, whereas perturbations created via Ens and PRISM
contain regular grid-resembling structures. The perturbation found
by PRISM additionally contains localized perturbations influenced
from xstart (Figure 8(c)), as suggested by Figure 9(a). Note the gra-
dient at the gull wing, greenish tint in background and retained
buffalo head.
